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Abstract 
 
There is increasing interest in designing systems such that the current many-to-one ratio of operators to 
unmanned vehicles (UVs) can be inverted. Instead of lower-level tasks performed by today’s UV teams, the 
sole operator would focus on high-level supervisory control tasks. A key challenge in the design of such 
single-operator systems will be the need to minimize periods of excessive workload that arise when critical 
tasks for several UVs occur simultaneously. Thus some kind of decision support is needed that facilitates 
an operator’s ability to evaluate different action alternatives for managing a multiple UV mission schedule 
in real-time. This paper describes two decision support experiments that attempted to provide UAV 
operators with multivariate scheduling assistance, with mixed results. Those automated decision support 
tools that provided more local, as opposed to global, visual recommendations produced superior 
performance, suggesting that meta-information displays could saturate operators and reduce performance. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 Unmanned vehicles (UVs) are quickly becoming ubiquitous in almost every aspect of hostile 
environment operations, including air, both on and under ground and water, and even space. With reduced 
radar signatures, increased endurance and the removal of humans from immediate threat, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) have become indispensable assets to militarized forces around the world. In addition to 
potential military applications, remotely guided underwater vehicles are regularly used by the oil and gas 
industry for maintenance purposes. Unmanned surface water vehicles are under development and testing 
for harbor patrol. The mining industry is increasingly looking towards remotely operated vehicles for 
solutions in very hostile climates. Transcending earthly bounds, unmanned ground vehicles are now 
exploring the surface of Mars by the remotely guided twin rovers, Spirit and Opportunity. However, despite 
the absence of a crew onboard any of these vehicles, human operators are still needed for supervisory 
control. 
 These UVs require human guidance to varying degrees and often through several operators. For 
example, the Predator requires a crew of three to be fully operational. However, with current military focus 
on streamlining operations and reducing staffing, there has been an increasing effort to design systems such 
that the current many-to-one ratio of operators to vehicles can be inverted. While this manpower inversion 
has received the most interest primarily in the air and ground unmanned vehicle domains, it can be seen in 
other domains such as mining. In order to replace multiple personnel currently required to operate a single 
UV with a single operator, the UVs will have to become more autonomous, and instead of lower-level tasks 
performed by today’s UV teams, the sole operator will need to focus on high-level supervisory control 
tasks such as monitoring mission timelines and reacting to emergent mission events.  
 A key challenge in the design of these futuristic one-controlling-many systems will be the need to 
minimize periods of excessive operator workload that can arise when critical tasks for several UVs occur 
simultaneously. To a certain degree, it is possible to predict and mitigate such periods in advance. 
However, actions that mitigate a particular period of high workload in the short term may create long-term 
episodes of high workload that were previously non-existent. Thus some kind of decision support is needed 
that facilitates an operator’s ability to evaluate different action alternatives for managing a mission 
schedule in real-time. To this end, this paper will present an iterative design cycle that attempts to leverage 
both intelligent, predictive aiding as well as human judgment and pattern recognition to maximize both 
human and system performance in the supervision of four UAVs. 
 
 
II. The Experimental Test Bed 
 
 To study what types of decision support tools would help an operator with multiple UAV schedule 
management, including what kinds of intelligent aiding would be the most beneficial, a dual screen 
simulation test bed named the Multi-Aerial Unmanned Vehicle Experiment (MAUVE) interface was 
developed (Figure 1). This interface allows an operator to supervise four independent UAVs 
simultaneously, and intervene as the situation requires. In this simulation, users take on the role of an 
operator responsible for supervising four UAVs tasked with destroying a set of time-sensitive targets in a 
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission. Because the simulated UAVs are highly autonomous, 
they only require that operators provide high level mission planning and execution actions as inputs. The 
operator’s job in the MAUVE simulation is to monitor each UAV’s progress, replan aspects of the mission 
in reaction to unexpected events, and in some cases manually execute mission critical actions such as 
arming and firing of payloads.  
 
 
Figure 1: The MAUVE dual screen interface 
 
 The UAVs supervised by participants in MAUVE were capable of six high-level actions in the 
simulation: traveling enroute to targets, loitering at specific locations, arming payloads, firing payloads, 
performing battle damage assessment, and returning to base, generally in this order. Battle damage 
assessment (BDA, otherwise known as battle damage imagery or BDI) is the post-firing phase of weapons 
release where imagery is taken of the target. In this simulation, BDA is semi-automated in the sense that 
operators are responsible for scheduling BDA in advance, but the UAV performs it automatically after 
firing, if scheduled. Performing BDA was not required for every target, but was dependent on preplanning 
or in-flight contingencies. 
 The left-hand side of the MAUVE interface is the navigation display, and it consists of a mission 
time window, map display, and a mission planning and execution bar (Figure 1, left side). A large mission 
time box showing both time elapsed and time remaining in absolute and relative terms is located on the top 
right of the display.  The map display represents a two-dimensional spatial layout of the battlespace, 
updated in real-time. Threat or hazard areas, circular in shape, have a striped yellow coloring pattern, and 
can be dynamic throughout scenarios, changing size, locations, disappearing entirely, or emerging as time 
progresses. The UAVs, always held constant at four, independently change colors according to their current 
action (one of the six as discussed previously).  
 Targets are designated by a diamond-shaped icon, and are assigned a relative priority of high (H), 
medium (M), or low (L). UAV routes on the map display can be changed in minor ways by selecting a 
particular waypoint or loiter point and dragging it to the desired location.  More major routing changes such 
as the addition or removal of waypoints, loiter points, or targets can be accomplished using the mission 
planning and execution bar to the left of the map. Routing changes were only required as a result of 
unexpected scenarios and represents real-time replanning.  
 Operators are provided with a “Request TOT Delay” button which allows them limited 
opportunities to manipulate the time-on-targets (TOTs) for those targets assigned. Operators can request a 
TOT delay for a given target for two reasons: 1) According to the current mission plan, they are predicted 
to arrive late to that target and therefore will miss their deadline, or 2) for workload purposes, i.e., if an 
operator feels they need to spread out a very high workload period to manage the UAVs more effectively. 
However, participants were warned that this function should be used with care because moving back one 
target’s deadline likely affects the UAV’s arrival time at all subsequent targets. A change of TOT is a 
request, not a command, and operators’ requests can be approved or denied. The probability of approval 
increases as a function of how far in advance of the deadline the request is sent, as would likely be the case 
in true military situations. When a TOT deadline is immediately approaching, the chance of approval is 
zero, but nearly 1.0 when requested 15 minutes in advance (participants were told this). Users can request 
as many TOT delays as they wished for a given target, but with no guarantee of approval.  
 The right-hand side of the MAUVE simulation in Figure 2 provides operator decision support, and 
consists of a UAV status window, chat box, UAV health and status updates, and the decision support 
window. The status window at the top left of the decision support display gives operators low level, 
detailed information for each UAV such as current target, current action being performed, position in 
latitude and longitude, course, and weapons information.  Speed and altitude are also shown in the status 
display, although they are not directly controllable by operators.  
 The bottom left of the decision support display (right side, Figure 1) has a text-based 
communication tool known as a chat box that contains a time history of all human communication 
interactions. The chat box is included because it is an established method of communications in current day 
military command and control scenarios, and is an embedded secondary workload tool [1]. The chat box 
window displays various notification messages that appear in response to scenario events or actions taken 
by users, as well as periodic task-relevant questions for operators to answer. One message that is 
particularly important to operators is notification that a TOT request is accepted or denied. The bottom 
right of the decision support display contains a UAV health and status notification window which separates 
human communications in the simulation from system communications, and only contains messages from 
individual UAVs.  
 The decision support always appears in the top right of the decision support display and the 
manipulation of the appearance and functionality of this window is the primary independent variable for 
two experiments that will be discussed in the next sections. The basic premise of the decision support is to 
simplify a priori mission planning information and provide a schedule of events and resource allocation for 
the pre-specified mission. The interface is detailed further in [2] 
 
III. Experiment 1—Level of automation in multiple UAV management 
 
 The focus of the first experiment was to determine what level of automation would provide the 
best decision support to operators. While many levels of automation were studied in this experiment (from 
no automated support to high levels in which the UAVs decided and acted autonomously, with limited 
human veto authority), only two will be presented here that demonstrate potential problems with intelligent 
aiding (Figure 2). (For detailed experimental results, see [2].) The decision support tool in Figure 2a, 
termed Passive because it only presents information, assimilates pre-planned mission information and 
transforms it into a 15 minute horizontal timeline format, color-coded by action.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Passive vs. Active Aiding in MAUVE  
(a) Passive Aiding     (b) Active Aiding  
 
 Figure 2b demonstrates the Active decision support, so named because it harnesses an algorithm 
which alerts the operator to possible periods of high workload and offers recommendations for resolution. 
The automation draws attention to these possible high workload areas through a reverse shading technique, 
in which potential “bottlenecks” are highlighted while the rest of the timeline’s colors are muted, but still 
visible. These bottlenecks are defined as predicted periods of time when two or more UAVs require human 
interaction. In this simulation, operator initiation of arming, firing, and BDA sequences was required, 
which meant that an operator had to follow a set of procedures to activate the event. The reverse shading 
technique was used to represent these bottlenecks since no information would be hidden, only made less 
salient, so that the operator’s attention could be directed to the appropriate areas of the schedule while 
allowing them to maintain situation awareness for the rest of the mission.  
 In addition to identifying areas of high workload, the computer also recommends a course of 
action to alleviate the high workload areas, such as moving a particular TOT. Tulga and Sheridan [3] 
demonstrated that even with preview in time-critical tasks, the time participants plan ahead typically 
decreases as workload increases, so we hypothesized that by providing both preview into the future as well 
automated recommendations, the need for planning time would be decreased and thus performance would 
improve. To this end, computer recommendations appeared in gray boxes to the right of each relevant 
UAV’s timeline. While the automation made locally optimal recommendations, the algorithm was not 
globally optimal. Following the computer’s recommendation to relieve a high workload area removed that 
particular schedule conflict, but sometimes created another in the process. Moreover, the algorithm’s 
predictions were more likely correct in the near-term (5 minutes), but more uncertain for events occurring 
15 minutes into the future. See [2] for more details concerning the scheduling and recommendation 
algorithms. 
 A total of 12 participants took part in this experiment, 10 men and 2 women, and were recruited if 
they had UAV, military and/or pilot experience. The subject population consisted of a combination of 
students, both undergraduates and graduates, as well as those from the local reserve officer training corps 
(ROTC) and active duty military personnel. Participants had two main objectives in this experiment: 1) To 
guide each UAV’s actions so all UAVs under their supervision properly executed the required missions, 
which changed over time, and 2) To answer periodic questions from commanders.  
 Two independent variables were of interest in this experiment: level of decision support (Figure 2) 
and level of replanning. The replanning factor represented an objective workload factor, so low and high 
levels of schedule replanning were investigated. The low replanning condition contained 7 replanning 
events, while the high replanning condition contained 13. The level of decision support was a between-
participants variable and the level of replanning was a within-participants repeated variable, so participants 
were randomly assigned to a LOA factor level but experienced both replanning conditions. 
 The results for the overall performance score, which measured how well participants achieved the 
numerous objectives for a test session (calculated as a product of the targets correctly destroyed, including 
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Figure 3: The influence of automation and re-planning on performance and delay requests. 
 a) Overall Performance     b) TOT Delay Requests          
their priority and difficulty level, and number of times BDA was correctly performed) were unexpected 
(Figure 3a). Under low workload, increasing automated decision support provided no additional benefit or 
negative consequence. While participants with either interface performed well under low workload (low 
replanning), particularly under high workload those subjects with the Active decision support performed 
significantly worse that those with the Passive (p=.027, all alpha = .05). This was unanticipated as it was 
originally thought that the more “intelligent” decision support would produce superior performance. 
Further investigation revealed that operators in the Active condition used the “Request TOT Delay” feature 
more than did those under the Passive Condition (Figure 3b). Use of this feature was indicative of 
ineffective strategies, which will be discussed below. 
 Situation awareness was captured through a subjective SA scale constructed from expert observer 
ratings. Situation awareness (SA) is generally defined as the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, and the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their 
status in the near future [4]. SA has three distinct levels, which are: 1) the perception of the elements in the 
environment, 2) the comprehension of the current situation, and 3) the projection of future status [4]. 
Subjective SA scales based upon expert observer ratings have been found to be a reliable and valid measure 
way to measure SA [5]. This expert rating scale was based upon threat area incursions, system wait time at 
targets, number of targets missed, and percentage of replanning events successfully completed. Although 
not statistically significant, the results showed a strong trend in which the operators with passive decision 
support had higher situation awareness than those with active decision support. 
 It was hypothesized that those participants in the Active condition performed poorly for two 
reasons. The first was the inability of the operators to generate appropriate stopping rules when trying to 
achieve a particular schedule change, as evidenced by their overuse of the Request TOT Delay function. 
Stopping rules are the criteria that individuals use to “satisfice” in uncertain situations, i.e. choosing the 
current best plan that is good enough [6]. While often humans can adapt effective heuristics for generating 
stopping rules [7], it is particularly difficult for them to do under dynamic, uncertain, and time-pressured 
conditions typical of command and control domains [8, 9]. To the detriment of other tasks and vehicles 
requiring their attention, participants often focused on obtaining a particular delay until they obtained it, 
often disregarding the probabilistic outcomes. In seeking to minimize TOT conflicts, participants narrowly 
focused on the timeline display, but on the future at the expense of the present. Because the operators 
focused on avoiding TOT conflicts for the entire schedule (which included events with a low probability of 
occurrence), they neglected more important elements of immediate UAV management and consequently 
performed poorly.  
 The second reason for poor performance was a tendency for operators to work towards eliminating 
TOT conflicts without considering the consequences of these changes. One possible contributor to this 
behavior was the reverse-shading visualization technique. The reverse shading highlighted potential high 
workload area. However, its salience relative to other information on the timeline may have been too high, 
especially in combination with the absence of more information about the uncertainty. Moreover, while the 
reverse shading notified operators of a possible problem, other than indicating which target should be 
delayed, the aid did not indicate what problems might be caused by delaying a target. Thus, the 
visualization made TOT conflicts very salient but did not reveal the consequence of TOT delays on 
subsequent TOT conflicts or target arrival times. Operators had no clear representation of how much worse 
the situation might be if the near-term problems were fixed. The results from this experiment motivated a 
redesign of the decision support, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
IV. The Decision Support Redesign 
 
 The first experiment shows that not only was the reverse shading too salient, but also that a 
significant variable was not explicitly represented, that of late target arrivals. A possible late arrival could 
be easily seen on the timeline (i.e., when the TOT window failed to align with the target icon), but this 
information was much less salient than the TOT conflicts and could easily go unnoticed. Although this was 
generally not a problem under low workload conditions, under high workload conditions, the more salient 
TOT conflicts drew attention away from more subtle display elements, such as the late arrival information. 
Moreover, because the salient TOT conflicts encouraged operators to request TOT delays under the Active 
condition, it likely initiated a prejudicial cycle in which the overly salient TOT conflicts led to the initiation 
of delays, which increased workload. This increased workload caused operators to rely more heavily on the 
salient elements of the display, which in turn led to the initiation of more delays. In this cycle that 
negatively impacted performance, operators were quickly saturated and did not see late arrivals in time to 
request a TOT delay. 
 As a result of these problems that surfaced in Experiment 1, two major changes were made. The 
first was the addition of a configural display to each UAV timeline, called the StarVis (Star Visualization) 
(Figure 4). A configural display is a single geometrical form that maps multiple variables onto it and 
changes in the individual variables cause the form to vary [10]. The variables integrated in the StarVis 
include the type of schedule problem (late arrival or TOT conflict), the number of targets involved in a 
specific problem type, and their relative priorities (low, medium, or high). Additionally, the StarVis is a 
projective “what if” tool, allowing operators to see the effects of requesting a TOT delay, prior to taking 
any action.  
 
              
 
 (a) Current problem (b) Projected “what if” problem 
 
Figure 4:  The StarVis decision support tool 
 
 The StarVis operates in two modes: current and projected problems. Figure 4a shows the default 
mode, which displays the current projected late target arrivals (left side) and TOT conflicts (right side) for a 
UAV in the next fifteen minutes. If no problem is predicted to exist in the next fifteen minutes of a UAV’s 
schedule, the StarVis contains a gray rectangle, which represents the ideal state. As problems are detected 
by the automation, gray triangles appear on the StarVis for one or more target problems in one of three 
locations (top for high priority (H), side for medium priority (M), and bottom for low priority (L).) These 
triangles represent a problem either for late target arrivals (left) or TOT conflicts (right). The height of each 
triangle represents the number of targets involved in a particular problem.  In Figure 4a, the UAV in 
question has a single projected late arrival for a low priority target (left) and one medium priority and two 
low priority time-on-target conflicts. 
 Next to the StarVis is the list of targets with these schedule problems, so they map to the triangles 
on the StarVis. By selecting one of the checkboxes (Figure 4b), the operator puts the StarVis into the 
projective “what-if” mode. By selecting a checkbox, the operator is virtually querying “if I request a TOT 
delay on this target, and it is granted, what will happen to this UAV’s schedule?”  Selecting a checkbox 
may cause yellow triangles to appear, which represent how the schedule is likely to change if the TOT 
request is granted. Split gray and yellow triangles indicate that the same problem that exists on the current 
timeline would continue to exist if the selected target was delayed. In Figure 4b, if a TOT delay request is 
made for T-11M (target 11 of medium priority), the low priority late target arrival would remain, but an 
additional high priority target would also be reached late. For the TOT conflicts, the medium priority target 
would still be in conflict, but only with one low priority target. For the case in Figure 4, requesting the TOT 
delay for T-11M would be inadvisable because additional higher level problems are created by this request. 
 The StarVis was designed to leverage direct perception-action which allows operators the ability 
to utilize more efficient perceptual processes rather than cognitively demanding processes that rely on 
memory, integration, and inference [11]. One important feature of configural displays that exploit the 
benefits of direct perception is the concept of an emergent feature. Emergent features are produced by the 
interaction between display elements, and provide a higher-level aggregate view of a system [10]. Visual 
representations of late arrivals or TOT conflicts “emerge” as the triangles grow from the base rectangle. In 
a quick glance, operators can immediately discern for not just one UAV, but for all of them, whether or not 
any problems exist (no triangles = no problems). The surface area provides a direct indicator as to which 
UAV is experiencing the most problems, and specifically what kind. Thus the StarVis provides a high-level 
overview through emergent features, but also provides low level details should an operator decide to focus 
on a particular variable of interest.  
  
V. Experiment 2 - Representation of local and 
global schedule conflicts 
 
 To assess this redesign, a second 
experiment was conducted. It was hypothesized that 
the presence of the StarVis would improve 
performance over a display without such a tool, as 
seen in Figure 5a. One important design 
consideration was exactly how to implement the 
StarVis display in terms of should it display local 
problems (per UAV) or should it display global 
issues (across all UAVs). In the local 
implementation, each UAV’s StarVis only showed 
how TOT delay requests affected that UAV’s 
schedule (called the Local StarVis, Figure 5b.) 
However, because TOT conflicts involve multiple 
UAVs’ near-simultaneous TOT occurrence, it was 
also hypothesized that perhaps a better 
implementation would be a more global one that 
showed for one target, how a TOT change would 
affect all the UAVs. This implementation was called 
Quasi-Global (shown as Q-Global in Figure 5c), 
because it showed how a TOT delay request for a 
single UAV propagated across the other UAVs. The 
Q-Global StarVis, however, did not show the 
operator how to fix all timeline problems at once, 
thus was not a fully global recommendation. Figure 
6 demonstrates the difference between the Local and 
Q-Global StarVis representations. 
 In the second experiment, 15 subjects took 
part (11 males and 4 females) and were given the 
same basic training, objectives, and test scenarios as 
those participants in Experiment 1. They also 
experienced the same low and high levels of 
replanning as in Experiment 1. The only difference 
was the type of visualization support, as seen in 
Figure 5. Because of the results of Experiment 1, the 
overly salient reverse shading was replaced with a 
simple dashed box outline for possible conflicts 
(Figure 5). 
 Figure 7 shows the results of the overall 
performance scores, which were calculated in the 
same manner as in Experiment 1. Two important 
trends can be seen in the data. First, the Local 
StarVis produced significantly better performance 
results under both low and high replanning than 
those participants with no decision support and the 
Q-Global StarVis (p=.004). Moreover, operators 
with Q-Global performed statistically no differently 
than those operators with no visualization support. Situation awareness measures were taken in exactly the 
same way as in Experiment 1 and they showed the same trend as the performance score, i.e., those subjects 
Figure 5:  Experiment #2 displays 
(c)  Q-Global StarVis  
(a)  Timeline Only 
(b)  Local StarVis 
with Local StarVis had the 
highest SA and Q-Global 
subjects had lower SA 
(p=.014), which was not 
statistically different from 
those with no visualization 
(p=.730). Another 
significant finding in this 
study in terms of SA was 
that those subjects with the 
Local StarVis did not 
experience any significant 
decrease in SA across 
levels of replanning, i.e., 
they had high SA in both 
the high and low 
replanning conditions 
(p=.001). However, 
operators with the other 
two visualizations 
experienced reduced SA 
when operational tempo 
increased. 
Figure 6: Local (left) vs. Quasi-Global (right) StarVis 
 The differences in performance scores across the visualizations (Figure 7) demonstrate that the 
same decision support tool, with a slightly different mapping of information, can produce dramatically 
different results. We hypothesize that this disparity in performance and situation awareness between the 
two StarVis conditions occurred because the Q-Global StarVis provided information that was not critical 
for the decision. Moreover, it was difficult to use in selecting a course of action, especially if the projective 
“what if” tool was used.   
 With the Q-Global StarVis, selecting a target checkbox often caused many split triangles (showing 
current and projective problems) and yellow triangles (showing projective problems) to appear on one or 
more StarVis configural displays across the UAVs. This property had negative consequences for operators.  
Similar to the reverse shading in Experiment 1, the Q-Global StarVis made global information salient, 
which was difficult for operators to understand because they had to look at all the UAV StarVis displays to 
understand the impact of a single 
decision. With the Local StarVis, 
however, selecting one target 
checkbox only affected the 
StarVis display of only one UAV. 
Thus, operators with the Local 
StarVis needed to only look at 
StarVis displays that 
corresponded to the checkboxes 
they had selected. This resulted in 
operators having less information 
to analyze in the “what if” 
condition. Although the Local 
StarVis was limited in its ability 
to show how a single decision 
would affect more than one UAV 
as compared to the information 
provided by the Q-Global StarVis 
across all UAVs, the projective 
“what if” information given in the 
Local StarVis was enough to help 
operators make effective 
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Figure 7: The effect of visualization on performance. 
decisions, even though the information was not globally optimal. Thus the Local SarVis display supported 
a “fast and frugal” heuristic [7] which allowed operators to quickly gather just enough information to make 
a satisficing decision. Such decision support tools are particularly useful in dynamic, military command 
and control environments where time pressure and uncertainty are high. However, it is important to note 
that decision support tools that support such heuristics must be evaluated to assess their robustness because 
poor performance could result if applied to situations that violate the assumptions underlying the heuristic.   
 Additionally, the Local StarVis design enabled strategies not seen in the first experiment. StarVis 
enabled operators to assess multiple options simultaneously. This was particularly true for TOT conflicts, 
where users could select the projective checkboxes for the targets involved and compare the effects 
directly. Operators with the Q-Global StarVis tended to have more difficultly in assessing the effects on the 
schedule of delaying one target versus taking no action. Toggling behavior, where users selected and 
deselected one target checkbox multiple times, was a strategy primarily used by Q-Global StarVis subjects 
to try to understand the difference in the current schedule and the what-if schedule for a possible TOT 
delay request. This toggling behavior was not as prevalent with Local StarVis subjects, who tended to 
spend less time using the StarVis than Q-Global subjects (Local Toggle Mean = 8.7, Q-Global Toggle 
Mean = 18.2.) 
 Yet another strategy exhibited was the use of the TOT Delay Request option. When examining the 
number of TOT delay requests, the results showed that subjects with either StarVis decision support 
visualization requested more TOT delays under high than low re-planning. The opposite was true for 
subjects that had no StarVis decision support. This is likely due to the fact that those subjects without a 
predictive visualization did not recognize potential conflicts in their existing schedule. In comparison with 
the TOT delay request results from Experiment 1, operators with both StarVis implementations performed 
better than those subjects using the Passive display. This suggests that neither StarVis display caused the 
same fixation on future TOT conflicts seen with the Active level of automation in Experiment 1. Thus, 
StarVis configural display, regardless of implementation, helped operators balance TOT conflicts with 
target delays to better manage their schedule. However, while the presence of either StarVis display helped 
subjects see possible future problems, only those with the Local StarVis were able to effectively solve the 
problems. 
 In addition, correlations between performance scores and TOT delays (r = -.550) and number of 
late arrival mitigations (r = .553) demonstrated that the best performing subjects did not request many TOT 
delays, and focused on fixing late arrivals instead of TOT conflicts, which was a more efficient strategy. 
These subjects realized early on that a late arrival was a more significant schedule problem than a TOT 
conflict, as a late arrival guaranteed that a target would be missed. However, TOT conflicts did not 
guarantee that targets would be missed, only that a future period of high workload could lead to a missed 
target.  
 Although the results suggest a strong benefit of the Local StarVis, the results call into question 
some of the components of the StarVis configural display. First, because subjects favored mitigating late 
target arrivals over TOT conflicts, which improved performance, it may be advantageous to eliminate TOT 
conflicts from the StarVis configural display. More generally, these results point to the need to match the 
content and salience of the display elements to their task importance. In addition, these experiments 
demonstrate the power of a visual representation in guiding operator behavior. An alternate solution to such 
a visualization might be to off-load the mitigation of TOT conflicts to automation, where an algorithm 
could search for TOT conflicts, use a cost function to determine how severe the conflict is, alert the 
operator when some threshold might be exceeded, and offer a recommendation for mitigation. This will be 
the next focus for work within this multiple UAV supervisory control simulation. 
 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
 In the quest to design systems such that a single operator can control multiple UAVs, decision 
support tools will be critical, but their effect on operator performance and situation awareness cannot 
always be predicted. The two studies presented here demonstrate that intelligent decision support design is 
not straightforward and that the most well-intentioned decision aids can actually undermine performance. 
 In the first experiment, which investigated how levels of automation affect an operator’s schedule 
management strategies in the supervision of multiple independent homogeneous UAVs, a predictive 
intelligent aid produced unexpectedly poor results. When provided with a visualization of potentially high 
workload periods, as well as automated recommendations for workload mitigation, operators attempted to 
globally optimize their schedules, and did not adequately weigh uncertainty in their decisions. This fixation 
on the future, potentially driven by visualization salience, prevented participants from generating effective 
stopping rules and significantly degraded their performance to the point that operators without any decision 
support performed better than those with intelligent aiding.  
 The second experiment, which tested a redesign of the original decision support that included a 
configural display (the StarVis) that allows for perceptual-based integration of multiple variables, 
demonstrated that the context of this display was critical in determining its effectiveness. In the “local” 
context in which the StarVis only showed future problems for a single UAV, the configural display 
promoted the best operator performance. However, when this same display was used to represent changes 
across all UAVs instead of one UAV for a single TOT change, performance significantly dropped and was 
no different from the performance of those participants who had no decision support. 
 One common trend that can be seen across both experiments is the impact of increasingly “global” 
displays that visually represent aggregated information. In the first experiment, a decision support tool that 
leveraged a predictive workload algorithm in concert with a visualization across all UAVs caused operators 
to focus more on globally optimizing the entire schedule. This fixation led to an inability to attend to more 
pressing, local events and performance was significantly degraded. In the second experiment, a decision 
support tool that demonstrated how a single TOT change would affect all UAVs led to significantly 
degraded performance as compared to decision support that only displayed how a TOT change would affect 
a single UAV. These experiments demonstrate two important considerations in how visualizations mediate 
the effect of intelligent aiding. First, operators attend to visually salient representations even if the 
information they contain is not the most critical for the task. Second, displays must be crafted so that they 
not only help operators notice a problem and identify the nature of the problem, but also to solve the 
problem. Thus, future decision support designs, whether visualization or recommendation-based, should 
take into account the importance of the information relative to its representation salience and how operators 
can use the display to solve emerging problems.  
 Identifying prediction visualization techniques and better automated recommendation schemes for 
time-sensitive operations will benefit not only futuristic multiple UAV operations, but also the entire 
concept of networked unmanned vehicle command and control operations. To this end, this research 
motivates the need to develop robust scheduling decision aids that convey possible options and uncertainty, 
while also effectively bounding the operator such that information overload is prevented and satisficing 
occurs in a time-constrained environment. The goal for multiple UV decision support tool design should be 
to develop a tool that allows humans use of their judgment, experience, and pattern recognition strengths 
but also constrains them so they do not revert to biased and potentially catastrophic heuristics, as well as 
suffer from information overload. While configural displays and aggregated information decision support 
tools have been suggested to promote effective decision-making, particularly in command and control 
applications (e.g., [12, 13]), this research clearly shows that integrated information displays are contextual 
and can undermine operator performance if not designed carefully.  
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